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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
IN RE CONTEMPT 
of 
NEUMAN C. PETTY, 
Brief of Respondent 
Case No. 
10690 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Neuman C. Petty, appeals from 
a judgment of the Honorable Merrill C. Faux, Judge 
of the Third Judicial District Court, finding the said 
Neuman C. Petty in contempt of court for refusal to 
testify in the trial of Billie Maurine Newsom, then 
pending in the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Neuman C. Petty, was called as 
a witness on behalf of the State of Utah to testify in 
the case of State of Utah v. Billie Maurine Newsom, 
Criminal No. 19534, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Mr. Petty, after giving his name and address, re-
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fused to answer any further questions posed by 
counsel on the grounds that the answers would 
tend to incriminate him. The Honorable Merrill C. 
Faux, judge, determined that the appellant's invoca-
tion of the privilege was not proper and adjudged 
the appellant in contempt of court. The appellant 
was sentenced to be imprisoned in the county jail 
for, a period of 30 days. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the adjudication 
of the appellant's contempt should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement 
of facts, in addition to those set forth in the appel-
lant's brief and in supplement there to: 
The appellant was called as a witness on be-
half of the State in the case of State of Utah v. Billie 
Maurine Newsom. Criminal No. 19534 (Tr. 51). Prior 
to the time the appellant was asked to testify, coun-
sel for Mrs. Newsom, who had apparently been , 
counsel for Mr. Petty, at one time, advised the court 
that Mr. Petty intended to invoke his privilege 
against self-incrimination (Tr. 51). Counsel indicated 
that the indictment against Mrs. Newsom arose out 
of the proceeding of the Salt Lake County Grand 
Jury during 1965. He further advised the court that 
Mr. Petty was under indictment for the crime of 
con$piracy to commit certain crimes in violation of 
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Title 76, Chapter 12, Section 1.1, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. A copy of that indictment appears in 
the record, page 9, of this appeal. Subsequent to 
argument, the district attorney, Mr. Jay E. Banks, 
was sworn and testified to a conversation he had 
with Mr. Petty (Tr. 58). He stated: 
"My name is Jay E. Banks; I am the District At-
torney in the Third Judicial District. I have knowl-
edge as of this time-independent knowledge-that 
the defendant in this case, Maurine-or Billy Maurine 
Newsom-went to Mr. Petty-Newman C. Petty-
prior to June 30th of 1965 and told him that she had 
taken some $400 and-approximately $460.00-and 
that she offered to repay it; and that a payroll de-
duction was taken out of two of her checks of $23.25 
each; and, then, that she paid Motor Lease, who was 
employed-who had employed her-and a balance in 
a check from her checking account in the sum of, oh, 
$419-and-something, approximately." 
Mr. Banks testified his knowledge came from a con-
versation with Mr. Petty before trial. 
Subsequent to the district attorney's testimony, 
he made a motion to dismiss so much of the con-
spiracy charge in Criminal Case No. 19538 as was 
then pending against the witness, Neuman C. Petty. 
Thereafter, three questions were asked of the wit-
ness, which he refused to answer. The first question 
was as follows: 
"Q During the year of 1964 and 1965, were you af-
filiated with Motor Lease?" 
The court stated that it had reviewed the matter and, 
in the opinion of the court, the question did call for 
"an answer and will not be incriminating nor de-
grading" (Tr. 73). In the face of the court's advice, 
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counsel for the appellant continued to advise his 
client not to answer the questions. m The appellant 
then refused to answer the question. The district 
attorney then asked if Mr. Petty would answer any 
question other than his name and address. Counsel 
for the appellant indicated that he would advise his 
client not to answer any questions (Tr. 74). The dis-
trict attorney then put the second question to the 
appellant, which was as follows: 
"Q All right; then, I will ask you if-ifyou know 
Maurine--or Billy Maurine Newsom?" 
Appellant refused to answer the question on the 
grounds that the answer would tend to incriminate 
him. The court advised the appellant that it could 
see nothing in the answer which would tend to in-
criminate him and directed that the question be 
answered. Appellant refused (Tr. 75). Subsequently, 
the district attorney asked the third question, which 
was as follows: 
"Q I will ask you if you were ever present when a 
conversation was had with Mrs. Newsom, the de-
fendant in this case, relative to any missing funds 
in Motor Lease?" 
Again, the appellant refused to answer the question. 
The court determined that the question was proper 
and admonished appellant to answer and he re-
fused. The district attorney then forewent any fur-
ther questioning, and the court adjudged the ap-
pellant in contempt of court. 
(1) At this time, Mr. Robert McRae appeared and represented the appellant. 
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Based upon the above facts and those allied 
facts set forth in the brief of appellant, non-argu-
mentative in nature, respondent submits that the 
adjudication of contempt should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT THE APPELLANT'S INVOCATION OF THE 
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
WAS IMPROPER, SINCE FROM THE RECORD, IT 
APPEARS THAT THE ANSWERS TO THE QUES-
TIONS POSED WOULD NOT TEND TO INCRIM-
INATE THE APPELLANT UNDER THE CIRCUM-
STANCES. 
Respondent concedes, for the purposes of this 
appeal only, that it is improper for a court to order 
a witness to answer a question, the answer to which 
might tend to incriminate the witness, even though, 
if the witness did. in fact, answer over his invocation 
of the privilege, a.fter being so directed by the court, 
the evidence could not be used against him. State 
v. Byington, 114 Utah 388, 200 P.2d 723. The respond-
ent does not, however, concede the correctness of 
the ruling in the Byington case, as such, but con-
cedes that if Mr. Petty's invocation of the privilege 
against self-incrimination was proper, he could not 
be found in contempt merely because, had he testi-
fied after admonition by the court, the evidence 
could not have been used against him. Raley v. 
Ohio, 360 US 423 (1957). The respondent concedes 
that the privilege against self-incrimination pro-
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tected the witness from being coerced to answer 
questions which may tend to incriminate him in the 
absence of a grant of immunity, even though, were 
he compelled to give the evidence, it could not be 
used against him. Section 77-31-9, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. 
It is, however, the position of the respondent 
that the questions posed by the district attorney, 
which the appellant refused to answer were (1) so 
innocuous and unlikely to incriminate as to warrant 
the court in determining that the invocation of the 
privilege was unjustified and (2) that in view of the 
district attorney's dismissal of the conspiracy charge 
against the appellant, there was no likelihood of in-
crimination and that the court's finding of contempt 
was justified. 
The respondent acknowledges that the provi-
sions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, as well as the provisions of Ar-
ticle I, Section 12, of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, protect an individual who is a witness from 
giving testimony which will tend to incriminate him. 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, (1963). 
It is submitted that the trial court, however, 
could correctly determine from the position of the 
case before him that there was no likelihood that 
the answers to the questions posed by the district 
attorney, if given by Mr. Petty, would tend to in-
criminate him. 
Section 77°31-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, al-
lows the prosecution at any time before the de-
fendants have gone into their defense to apply to 
the court for dismissal of the charge in exchange 
for the testimony of the defendant as a witness for 
the State. In the instant case, the district attorney 
dismissed the charges against the witness, Neuman 
C. Petty; on the indictment for conspiracy pending 
in the district court. Consequently, this dismissal, 
in exchange for his testimony under the above stat-
ute, and 77-31-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, would 
preclude subsequent prosecution of the case, and 
therefore· give to the witness protection agairk-1 
prosecution relating to that charge. It could not 
therefore be contended that any testimony that Petty 
gave would be likely to incriminate him under the 
pending indictment. Even so, -it is submitted that 
the questions posed by the district attorney were so 
preliminary and so innocuous that there was no real 
likelihood that the answers the witness might give 
would be likely to incriminate. 
It is well settled that a claim of privilege must 
be more than a fanciful or imaginary danger; it must 
be real and relate to a "probability" of prosecution. 
4 Jones, Evidence, Sec. 861 (l 958). McCormick, Evi-
dence, p. 271 (1954), comments on the- required 
showing: 
''A classic statement of the test is that 'the Court 
must see, from the circumstances of the case, and the 
nature of the evidence which the witness is called to 
give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend 
danger to the witness from his being compelled to 
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answer. It seems that to meet this test the court must 
find ( 1) that· there is substantial probability that 
the witness has committed a crime under the law of 
the forum and (2) that the fact called for is an es-
sential part of the crime, or is a fact which taken 
with other facts already proved, or which may prob-
ably be proved, would make out a circumstantial 
case of guilt." 
See also Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2261. 
In Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917), 
the United States Supreme Court noted the general 
standard was expressed: 
"The constitutional protection against self-incrimina-
tion 'is confined to real danger and does not extend 
to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of 
law.' " 
Further, the court noted: 
"The general rule under which the trial judge filust 
determine each claim according to its own particular 
circumstances, we think, is indicated with adequate 
certainty in the above cited opinions. Ordinarily, he 
is in much better position to appreciate the essential 
facts than an appellate court can hold and he must 
be permitted to exercise some discretion, fructified by 
common sense, when dealing with this necessarily 
difficult subject. Unless there has been a distinct 
denial of a right guaranteed, we ought not to inter-
fere. 
"In the present case the witnesses certainly were not 
relieved from answering merely because they de-
clared that so to do might incriminate them. The wis-
dom of the rule in this regard is well illustrated by the 
enforced answer, ' I don't know,' given by Mason to 
the second question, after he had refused to replay 
under a claim of constitutional privilege." 
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The first questton uf whether the witness, Neu-
man Petty, was associated with Motor Lease could 
hardly tend to incriminate him where there was no 
conspiracy charge pending against him, and his 
mere association with the company would in no 
way draw him to liability for some remote wrong-
doing. Certainly, also, the ·question of whether or 
not he knew the defendant in the instant case was 
a neutral question, the answer to which would not 
place the appellant in any position where it would 
tend to incriminate him. Whether he knew Billie 
Maurine Newsom or not would hardly be an in-
criminating factor, and there was no indication that 
merely knowing her would lead to his prosecution 
or the likelihood of his being charged or convicted 
of any offense, nor even, for that matter, be rele-
vant or responsive to the conspiracy indictment 
which was barred by the district attorney's dismissal 
under the provisions of Section 77-31-9, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. Certainly, those two questions 
were so innocuous that they posed no real possibil-
ity that the witness would be placed in jeopardy 
had he responded in each instance with a simple 
"yes" answer, ·which was the obvious conclusion 
called for. 
The question as to whether he had ever had a 
conversation with Mrs. Newsom relative to any 
missing funds in Motor Lease is equally innocuous, 
and the premise the appellant now seeks to sustain 
the basis for his refusal to answer has no legal 
merit. The district attorney's testimony was to the 
lln 
effect that he ha'd -a conversation with Mr~ Peffy in 
which Mr. Petty acknowledged that Billie Maurine 
Newsom had embezzled some money from Motor 
Lease, Inc., and that it had been paid back. Appel-
lant attempts to raise this action into the area of 
making Mr. Petty an accessory to a crime. If Mr. 
Petty was an officer of Motor Lease, which he was, 
he would certainly have a right to make arrange-
ments to recoup funds converted by an employee. 
Further, an agreement to accept repayment of funds 
and not to pursue any further prosecution would 
not render the appellant an accessory. Section 76-1-
45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, defines "acces-
sories as follows: 
"All persons who, after full knowledge that a felony 
has been committed, conceal it from a magistrate, or 
harbor and protect the person who committed it, are 
accessories." -
There is no affirmative obligation imposed by the 
statute on the part of an individual who has mere 
knowledge of a crime to disclose it. He must actively 
conceal it from a magistrate or harbor or protect the 
person who committed it. Consequently, the actions 
indicated by counsel for the appellant, Mr. Hatch, 
at the time he was arguing in favor of the invocation 
of -the ·privilege on the possibility that Mr. Petty 
would be subjected to a prosecution as an accessory 
do not hold up under the statute. 
Finally, the appellant cites Section 76-28-58, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, relating to compound-
ing or concealing crime as being applicable, and 
1-
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that had Mr. Petty accepted repayment and indi-
cated that he would not prosecute, he could pos-
sibly be guilty under the provisions of that section. 
It is submitted that there is no merit to that conten-
tion, since Section 76-28-58, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, applies where an individual has knowledge of 
the crime, takes money or property of another or 
grutuity or award or any engagement of promise 
thereof to compound and conceal the crime. The 
facts as testified to by the district attorney and even 
when construed in a light most favorable to the 
appellant, as indicated by Mr. Hatch, does not justi-
fy a finding that that provision was violated. Indeed,, 
there was merely an understanding, at best, that the· 
witness would accept repayment of funds to which 
the witness or his company was entitled. This is not 
a violation of Section 76-28-58, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. As a matter of broader principle, the State 
would be most happy to accept the position urged 
by the appellant that his conduct could subject him 
to prosecution as an accessory or for concealing or 
compounding a crime, for to do so would construe 
the Utah statutes in accordance with the commo!l 
law offense of misprision of a felony. Russell on 
Crime, 12th Ed., Vol. 1, pp 167-168 (1963); Goldberg, 
Misprision of Felony: An Old Concept in a New 
Context. 52 ABAJ 148 (1966); Regina v. Crimmins. 
ll959J V.R. 270. 
It is submitted, however, that it was obviously 
not the intent of the Legislature to have the above 
mentioned sections so broadly construed as appel-
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lant" would now argue. Therefore, there was no pos-
sibility of his prosecution under either of the 
statutes. Consequently, at the time the appellant re-
fused to answer the third question posed by the 
district attorney, there was no likelihood of him in-
criminating himself. 
From what has been said, and at least, certain-
ly, as to the first two questions asked, there was no 
likelihood of the appellant in any way incriminating 
himself or any tendency that the testimony he would 
give would incriminate him. Obviously, the appel-
lant was participating in a defense scheme to 
frustrate the prosecution of the case pending against 
Billie Maurine Newsom. 
In The Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 121 Eng. 
Rep. 730 (1861), it was said as to the privilege: 
"Further than this, we are of opinion that the dangpr 
to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, 
with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the 
ordinary course of things-not a danger of an imag-
inary and unsubstantial character, having reference 
to some extra-ordinary and barely possible contingen-
cy, so improbable that no reasonable man would 
suffer it to influence his conduct. We think that a 
merely remote and naked possibility, out of the or-
dinary course of the law and such as no reasonable 
man would be affected by, should not be suffered to 
obstruct the administration of justice. The object of 
the law is to afford to a party, called upon to give 
evidence in a proceeding inter alios, protection 
against being brought by means of his own evidence 
within the penalties of the law. But it would be to 
convert a salutary protection into a means of abuse 
if it were to be held that a mere imaginary possibility 
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of danger, however remote and improbable, wa~ suf-
ficient to justify the withholding of evidence essential 
to the ends of justice." 
The circumstances of the instant case are almost 
squarely within the law of the Mason case and 
Boyes case referred to above. Under these circum-
stances, it can hardly be said that the trial judge, 
who saw the witnesses and their expressions. 
abused his discretion in finding that there was no 
real danger to appellant from answering the prose-
cution' s questions. 
Courts have always recognized a requirement 
that there be a substantial likelihood of injury or 
actual prosecution. McNaughton, The Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination, Its Constitutional Affec-
tion, Raisor D'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 
51 Jnl. of Crim. Law, Criminology and Police Sci-
ence, p. 138 (1960). 
Even applying the broad standards of Malloy 
v. Hogan, supra, as set down by the United States 
Supreme Court, it is apparent that there was no sub-
stantial likelihood or even a possibility that the ap-
pellant's testimony in response to the questions 
posed by the district attorney would have incrim-
inated him. See also Hoffman v. United States, 341 
U.S. 479 0951) at p. 486. 
It is submitted that certainly the question of 
whether or not the appellant knew Billie Maurine 
Newsom could not have had a tendency to incrim-
inate him, and that in any event, even if the other 
questions, by the wildest stretch .. of im.a9in~tion, 
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could be said to have had a possibility to incrimin-
ate, the one question standing and the appellant's 
refusal to respond would justify the trial court's con-
viction. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO IN-
VOKE HIS PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIM-
INATION BY PREVIOUS STATEMENTS MADE 
TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT. 
The testimony of District Attorney Jay E. Banks 
was to the effect that the appellant had previously 
disclosed certain information to him, which informa-
tion was covered by the questions asked the appel-
lant. It is submitted that, as a consequence, the ap· 
pellant has waived any right to claim the privilege 
against self-incrimination. The State does not con-
tend that the position argued in this point is sup-
ported by the majority of courts. In Re Neff. 206 F.2d 
149 (3rd Cir. 1953); 36 A.L.R.2d 1398; Wigmore Evi-
dence, Sec. 2275. However, no decision of the United 
States Supreme Court has been found directly pass· 
ing on this issue, and it is submitted that the better 
rule is that espoused by Professor McCormick in 
his treatise on evidence, where he observes that 
there "could be a strong contrary argument" on 
whether prior disclosure of the incriminating fact 
· would be a claim of privilege at a later time on the 
· same subject matter .. 
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Consequently, it is submitted that until the 
United States Supreme Court has clearly said that 
previous disclosure of evidence that may be subso-
quen tl y claimed to be incriminatory does no! csm-
stitute a waiver, that this court should adopt the 
position advocated by Professor McCormick, which 
is certainly the most reasonable position. Once the 
cat is out of the bag, there seems to be little reason 
why the privilege against self-incrimination should 
still be available to a witness, especially where the 
nature of the prior disclosure was such that the evi-
dence could be used against the individual, if the 
prosecution was so inclined to do so. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the 
appellant had waived his right against self-incrim-
ination. 
CONCLUSION 
An examination of the record in this case clear-
ly demonstrates that there was no reasonable in-
vocation of the privilege against self-incrimination 
by the appellant. There simply was no danger that 
the answers to the three questions posed by the dis-
trict attorney, or any one of them, would tend to 
incriminate the appellant. Further, the respondent 
submits that even if it can be said that any one of 
the questions might have had a tendency to incrim-
inate, that the other questions were such that there 
was no possibility of their evoking.an incriminatory 
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response. Consequently, the trial court's determina-
tion to hold the appellant in contempt was justified. 
This qqurt shql),ld affirm. 
Respectfully submitted~ 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
